Course 2011-2012 a.y.

Go to class group/s: 31

CLEAM (6 credits - II sem. - OP  |  SECS-P/09) - CLEF (6 credits - II sem. - OP  |  SECS-P/09) - CLEACC (6 credits - II sem. - OP  |  SECS-P/09) - BESS-CLES (6 credits - II sem. - OP  |  SECS-P/09) - BIEMF (6 credits - II sem. - OP  |  SECS-P/09)

Course Director:
FAUSTO PANUNZI

Course Objectives

The aim of this course is to show how financing decisions are affected by moral hazard and asymmetric information and how different securities can (or cannot) mitigate the associated agency costs. The course reviews the theoretical literature on financial contracting.

Course Content Summary

• Capital structure in a perfect market: the Modigliani-Miller propositions
• Early theories: debt overhang, pecking order
• Financing capacity with moral hazard: credit rationing
• Boosting the ability to borrow: monitoring, collateral, microfinance
• Corporate finance under asymmetric information
• Control rights
• Monitoring and ownership concentration
• Law, politics and finance
• The Financial Crisis

Detailed Description of Assessment Methods

There is a written final exam, consisting of analytical exercises. A partial exam is scheduled.

Textbooks

The reading list and lecture notes are posted on the e-learning website

Exam textbooks & Online Articles (check availability at the Library)

Prerequisites

none

Last change 20/04/2011 15:56