6139 - THEORY OF INCENTIVES AND CONTRACTS
CLEAM - CLES - CLEF - BIEM - CLEACC
Department of Economics
Course taught in English
Go to class group/s: 31
CLEAM (6 credits - I sem. - OP | SECS-P/01) - CLES (6 credits - I sem. - OP | SECS-P/01) - CLEF (6 credits - I sem. - OP | SECS-P/01) - BIEM (6 credits - I sem. - OP | SECS-P/01) - CLEACC (6 credits - I sem. - OP | SECS-P/01)
Course Director:
NENAD KOS
NENAD KOS
Course Objectives
This course aims at covering basic materials in the domain of information economics. We build on the courses of Microeconomics to study the new issues that come up in standard economies when informational imperfections impact the markets. The interests of such models are illustrated through a number of applications: financial markets, compensation policies, with special attention given to organizational design.
Course Content Summary
- Introduction to the theory of contracts
- Hidden information: screening
- Hidden information: signalling
- Hidden action: moral hazard
- Applications to financial contracting
- Applications to labour markets and organizations
- Incomplete contracts and the theory of the firm
Detailed Description of Assessment Methods
Written partial exam (40% of the grade)
Written final exam (60% of the grade)
Textbooks
- B. Salanie, The Economics of Contracts, MIT press (not compulsory to purchase)
- Lecture notes + some survey articles
Prerequisites
Microeconomics
Last change 01/04/2010 18:30