MARCO M. OTTAVIANI

We compare the informativeness of order statistics in a sample of conditionally independent draws from a distribution F(x|θ ) as the sample size n increases. The k-th highest of n + 1 draws is more accurate than the k-th highest of n if and only if the cumulative reverse hazard − log F(x|θ ) is log-supermodular. Symmetrically, the k-th lowest is more accurate if and only if the cumulative hazard − log(1 − F(x|θ )) is log-supermodular. Reversals are exceptional, occurring only for experiments that are, up to increasing transformations, exponential location experiments. In large samples, middle order statistics are asymptotically fully informative, while bounded lower and upper ranks require unbounded informativeness tail conditions. When full learning fails, bounded ranks converge to location experiments, and more central ranks are Blackwell more informative. Extending the analysis from scalar order statistics to blocks of selected data, we obtain multidimensional comparisons under log-supermodularity of hazard rates. The results unify and extend information-aggregation results in auctions and provide a new order-statistic approach to strategic voting.

• Information Comparison of Order Statistics, with Applications to Auctions and Voting (276 Kb)

How should multiple and possibly heterogeneous risky projects be optimally grouped into separately financed conglomerates?

• Separate or Joint Financing? Optimal Conglomeration with Bankruptcy Costs (253 Kb)

How should a principal provide agents with incentives to conduct sequential search?

• Search Agency (220 Kb)

Timing of parimutuel bets driven by two incentives: bettors want to place large early bets to pre-empt the rivals, but also want to wait to conceal information.

• The Timing of Parimutuel Bets (323 Kb)

Comparison of equilibrium outcomes in parimutuel and fixed-odds competitive markets with privately informed bettors.

• Parimutuel versus Fixed-Odds Markets (165 Kb)

Characterization of equilibrium in Hotelling location model with private information, with applications to strategic forecasting and political economy.

• Forecasting and Rank-Order Contests (352 Kb)

How is downstream competition affected by the contractual terms used to sell essential inputs to competitors?

• Contracts and Competition in the Pay-TV Market (346 Kb)

Analysis of issues relevant for regulation of independent financial advisers: communication to unsophisticated audience, information acquisition by advisers, uncertainty about the conflict of interest, and optimal incentive design.

• The Economics of Advice (334 Kb)