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Working papers

Regulation with Experimentation: Ex Ante Approval, Ex Post Withdrawal, and Liability
Emeric Henry, Marco Loseto, and Marco Ottaviani

Tractable continuous-time model to study the optimal mix of the three instruments regulators employ to align the private incentives of firms: ex ante approval regulation, ex post withdrawal regulation, and liability. Results can rationalize the array of regulatory environments observed across applications ranging from product safety to patent protection.

Last change 19/10/2019

Looking into Crystal Balls: An Experiment on Reputational Cheap Talk
Debrah Meloso, Marco Ottaviani, and Salvatore Nunnari

Do expert motivated by their reputation for being well informed have an incentive to misreport their information? As predicted by reputational cheap talk theory, reporters are more likely to report truthfully when the state of the world is more uncertain and when evaluators conjecture that reporters always report truthfully. However, evaluators have difficulty learning reporters' strategies and tend to overreact to message accuracy, exacerbating reporters' incentives to misreport.

Last change 26/11/2018

Strategic Sample Selection
Alfredo Di Tillio, Marco Ottaviani, and Peter Norman Sorensen

Evaluates the welfare impact of sample selection, with applications to information aggregation in auctions, examinee choice in educational testing, manipulation of evidence in statistical inference, and peremptory challenge in juries.


Last change 28/07/2020

Separate or Joint Financing? Optimal Conglomeration with Bankruptcy Costs
Albert Banal Estanol and Marco Ottaviani.

How should multiple and possibly heterogeneous risky projects be optimally grouped into separately financed conglomerates?

Last change 14/05/2013

Approval Regulation and Learning, with Application to Timing of Merger Control
Marco Ottaviani and Abraham Wickelgren

This paper is the winner of the 2009 Robert F. Lanzillotti Prize for best paper in antitrust economics at the International Industrial Organization Conference. Casts tradeoff between ex ante regulation (based on limited information about sign and magnitude of externality) and ex post policy intervention (involving costly reversion) as a collective experimentation problem.          

Last change 21/12/2012

Search Agency
Tracy R. Lewis and Marco Ottaviani

How should a principal provide agents with incentives to conduct sequential search?

Last change 21/12/2012

The Timing of Parimutuel Bets
Marco Ottaviani and Peter Norman Sorensen.

Timing of parimutuel bets driven by two incentives: bettors want to place large early bets to pre-empt the rivals, but also want to wait to conceal information.

Last change 21/06/2013

Parimutuel versus Fixed-Odds Markets
Marco Ottaviani and Peter Norman Sorensen

Comparison of equilibrium outcomes in parimutuel and fixed-odds competitive markets with privately informed bettors.

Last change 21/06/2013

Forecasting and Rank-Order Contests
Marco Ottaviani and Peter Norman Sorensen

Characterization of equilibrium in Hotelling location model with private information, with applications to strategic forecasting and political economy.

Last change 21/06/2013

Contracts and Competition in the Pay-TV Market
David Harbord and Marco Ottaviani

How is downstream competition affected by the contractual terms used to sell essential inputs to competitors?

Last change 21/12/2012

The Economics of Advice
Marco Ottaviani

Analysis of issues relevant for regulation of independent financial advisers: communication to unsophisticated audience, information acquisition by advisers, uncertainty about the conflict of interest, and optimal incentive design.

Last change 21/12/2012

Last change 18/11/2011