Course 2006-2007 a.y.

8283 - GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC THINKING


GM-LS - MM-LS - OSI-LS - AFC-LS - CLAPI-LS - CLEFIN-LS - CLELI-LS - CLEACC-LS - DES-LS - CLEMIT-LS - CLG-LS

Department of Economics

Course taught in English

Go to class group/s: 31
GM-LS (6 credits - II sem. - AI) - MM-LS (6 credits - II sem. - AI) - OSI-LS (6 credits - II sem. - AI) - AFC-LS (6 credits - II sem. - AI) - CLAPI-LS (6 credits - II sem. - AI) - CLEFIN-LS (6 credits - II sem. - AI) - CLELI-LS (6 credits - II sem. - AI) - CLEACC-LS (6 credits - II sem. - AI) - DES-LS (6 credits - II sem. - AI) - CLEMIT-LS (6 credits - II sem. - AI) - CLG-LS (6 credits - II sem. - AI)
Course Director:
PIERPAOLO BATTIGALLI

Classes: 31 (II sem.)
Instructors:
Class 31: PIERPAOLO BATTIGALLI


Course Objectives

This course provides an introduction to Game Theory, the formal analysis of strategic interaction. Game Theory now pervades most non-elementary models in microeconomic theory and many models in the other branches of economics. The course introduces the necessary analytical tools to be able to understand these models, and illustrates them with some economic applications. The course also aims at developing an abstract analysis of strategic thinking, a critical and open minded attitude toward the standard as well as new game theoretic concepts, and to correct some widespread misunderstandings of game theory.


Course Content Summary

  • Introduction to interactive decision theory, terminology, notation.
  • Rationality and dominance, rationalizability.
  • Nash equilibrium, interpretation, existence.
  • Mixed strategy equilibrium, interpretation, existence.
  • Games with asymmetric or incomplete information.
  • Dynamic games, strategic forms, weak dominance, backward and forward
    induction.
  • Subgame perfect equilibrium, one-shot-deviation principle.
  • Repeated games and multiplicity of equilibria.
  • Bargaining games and uniqueness of equilibrium.
  • Dynamic games with asymmetric or incomplete information, equivalence
    principles.
  • System of beliefs and perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
  • Signaling games, pooling and separating equilibria, intuitive criterion.

Detailed Description of Assessment Methods

Written Exam 


Textbooks

  • M.J. OSBORNE, A. RUBINSTEIN, A Course in Game Theory, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1994.
  • Additional lectures notes will be distributed during the course.

For further and continuously updated information consult the  IEP web site or contact  S.I.D. - Servizio Informazioni Didattica - Institute of Economics - via Gobbi, 5 - Room 313. 

Exam textbooks & Online Articles (check availability at the Library)
Last change 19/05/2006 00:00