Courses a.y. 2021/2022
30419 COMPUTATIONAL MICROECONOMICS - MODULE 2 (MECHANISM DESIGN)
30460 INCENTIVES DESIGN AND POLICY
Born March 10th, 1965. Degree in Economics from Università Bocconi. PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. PhD in Economics from the Università di Pavia.
Full Professor of Economics. Research Fellow, CEPR and IGIER; Research Associate, ECGI. Since November 2016 Dean of General Affairs. Head of Ettore Bocconi Department of Economics from 2010 to 2013. Previously, he was a full professor in the Faculty of Economics, Università di Bologna; Associate Professor at Università Bocconi; Researcher at the Università di Pavia; Lecturer at University College, London; Research fellow at IDEI (Toulouse).
Corporate theory. Corporate finance. Contract theory.
Minority Block and Takeover Premia, (with M. Burkart and D. Gromb), Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (2006); Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration and Legal Shareholder Protection, (with M.Burkart), Journal of Financial Intermediation (2006); Reallocation of corporate resources and managerial incentives in internal capital markets (with Brusco), European Economic Review, April 2005; Tender Offers and Leverage (with H. Mueller), Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 2004; "Mandatory Bids, Squeeze-out, Sell-out and the Dynamics of the Tender Offer Process" (with M. Burkart), in Reforming Company and Takeover Law in Europe (eds. G. Ferrarini, K.J. Hopt, J. Winter and E. Wymeersch), Oxford University Press, 2004; "Family Firms", (with M. Burkart and A. Shleifer), in Journal of Finance, October 2003; "Agency Conflicts in Public and Negotiated Transfers of Corporate Control" (with M. Burkart and D. Gromb), in Journal of Finance, April 2000; "Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders" (with M. Burkart and D. Gromb), in Journal of Political Economy, February 1998, 172-204; "Large Shareholders, Monitoring and the Value of the Firm" (with M. Burkart and D. Gromb), in Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 1997, 693-728.