30176 - FINANCIAL CONTRACTING
CLEAM - CLEF - CLEACC - BESS-CLES - BIEMF
Course taught in English
Go to class group/s: 31
The aim of this course is to show how financing decisions are affected by moral hazard and asymmetric information and how different securities can (or cannot) mitigate the associated agency costs. The course reviews the theoretical literature on financial contracting.
- Capital structure in a perfect market: the Modigliani-Miller propositions.
- Early theories: debt overhang, pecking order.
- Financing capacity with moral hazard: credit rationing.
- Boosting the ability to borrow: monitoring, collateral, microfinance.
- Corporate finance under asymmetric information.
- Control rights.
- Monitoring and ownership concentration.
- Law, politics and finance.
- The Financial Crisis.