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The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms
(with Alfredo Di Tillio and Matthias Messner), May 2016, The Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.


Just Enough or All: Selling a Firm
(with Mehmet Ekmekci and Rakesh Vohra), AEJ: Micro, 8 (2016), 223-256.


Information in Tender Offers with a Large Shareholder
(with Mehmet Ekmekci), Econometrica, 84 (2016), 87-139.


Asking Questions
Games and Economic Behavior, 87 (2014), 642-650.


Incentive Compatibility in Non-quasilinear Environments
(with Matthias Messner), Economic Letters, 121 (2013), 12-14.


Extremal Incentive Compatible Transfers
 (with Matthias Messner),  Journal of Economic Theory, 148 (2013), 134-164.


Communication and Efficiency in Auctions
Games and Economic Behavior, 75 (2012), 233-249.

Working Papers

Competing for Surplus in a Trade Environment
(with Sarah Auster and Salvatore Piccolo), May 2017.

Optimal Selling Mechanisms Under Moment Conditions
(with Vinicius Carrasco, Vitor Farinha Luz, Matthias Messner, Paulo Monteiro and Humberto Moreria), April 2017.


Value of Information and Fairness Opinions in Takeovers
(with Mehmet Ekmekci), June 2014.                          


Conditional Offers in Takeovers with a Large Shareholder
(with Mehmet Ekmekci), preliminary.


Efficient Trade Mechanism with Discrete Values  
(with Mihai Manea), preliminary.


Last change 25/05/2017

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