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Persuasion Bias in Science: Can Economics Help?, with Marco Ottaviani and Peter Normal Sorensen, November 2015, conditionally accepted by The Economic Journal.

Characterizing the Strategic Impact of Misspecified Beliefs, (Supplemental Appendix) with Yi-Chun ChenEduardo Faingoldand Siyang XiongThe Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.

The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms, with Nenad Kos and Matthias MessnerThe Review of Economic Studies, forthcoming.

Conditional Belief Types, with Joe Halpern and Dov SametGames and Economic Behavior87 (September 2014), pp. 253-268.

Strategies and Interactive Beliefs in Dynamic Games, with Pierpaolo Battigalli and Dov Samet, in Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Tenth World Congress, Volume I, Economic Theory, Cambridge University Press, 2013.

The Predictive Role of Counterfactuals, with Itzhak Gilboa and Larry SamuelsonTheory and Decision74 (February 2013), pp. 167-182.

A Robustness Result for Rationalizable Implementation, Games and Economic Behavior72 (May 2011), 301-305.

Interactive Epistemology and Solution Concepts for Games with Asymmetric Informationwith Pierpaolo BattigalliEdoardo Grilloand Antonio Penta, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Advances)11 (January 2011).

Uniform Topologies on Typeswith Yi-Chun ChenEduardo Faingoldand Siyang Xiong, Theoretical Economics 5 (September 2010), 445-478.

Subjective Expected Utility in Games, Theoretical Economics 3 (September 2008), 287-323.

A Note on One-Shot Public Mediated Talk, Games and Economic Behavior 46 (February 2004), 425-433.

Bounded Recall Strategies and Public Monitoring, April 2004.

Forward Induction and Admissibility in Repeated Coordination Games, July 2002.

Iterated Expectations with Common Belief, August 2001.

 


Last updated November 18, 2016