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Working papers

Strategic Sample Selection
Alfredo Di Tillio, Marco Ottaviani, and Peter Norman Sorensen


Develops framework based on dispersion to evaluate the impact of sample selection on the quality of statistical inference, with application to manipulation of empirical evidence.

Strategic Sample Selection (Supplementary Appendix)

 


Last change 24/09/2017

Research and Approval Process: The Organization of Persuasion
Emeric Henry and Marco Ottaviani


Organizational deconstruction of Wald's model of sequential information acquisition, bridging experimentation with persuasion. The payoff and control rights of a statistician (planner) are split between an evaluator and an informer. The informer provide costly information with the aim of persuading the evaluator to approve. Welare analyis + application to approval regulation, including FDA's supervision of clinical trials.

 


  • Research and Approval Process: The Organization of Persuasion (1.461 Kb)
  • Last change 06/12/2017

    Persuasion through Selective Disclosure: Implications for Marketing, Campaigning, and Privacy Regulation
    Florian Hoffmann, Roman Inderst and Marco Ottaviani


    Model of equilibrium persuasion through selective disclosure. Positive and normative implications depending on: the extent of competition among senders, whether receivers are wary of senders collecting personalized data, whether firms are able to personalize prices, and whether receivers make individual or collective decisions.

     


  • Persuasion through Selective Disclosure: Implications for Marketing, Campaigning, and Privacy Regulation (760 Kb)
  • Last change 09/09/2017

    Separate or Joint Financing? Optimal Conglomeration with Bankruptcy Costs
    Albert Banal Estanol and Marco Ottaviani.


    How should multiple and possibly heterogeneous risky projects be optimally grouped into separately financed conglomerates?



  • Separate or Joint Financing? Optimal Conglomeration with Bankruptcy Costs (253 Kb)
  • Last change 14/05/2013

    Approval Regulation and Learning, with Application to Timing of Merger Control
    Marco Ottaviani and Abraham Wickelgren


    This paper is the winner of the 2009 Robert F. Lanzillotti Prize for best paper in antitrust economics at the International Industrial Organization Conference. Casts tradeoff between ex ante regulation (based on limited information about sign and magnitude of externality) and ex post policy intervention (involving costly reversion) as a collective experimentation problem.          



  • Approval Regulation and Learning, with Application to Timing of Merger Control (289 Kb)
  • Last change 21/12/2012

    Search Agency
    Tracy R. Lewis and Marco Ottaviani


    How should a principal provide agents with incentives to conduct sequential search?



  • Search Agency (220 Kb)
  • Last change 21/12/2012

    The Timing of Parimutuel Bets
    Marco Ottaviani and Peter Norman Sorensen.


    Timing of parimutuel bets driven by two incentives: bettors want to place large early bets to pre-empt the rivals, but also want to wait to conceal information.



  • The Timing of Parimutuel Bets (323 Kb)
  • Last change 21/06/2013

    Parimutuel versus Fixed-Odds Markets
    Marco Ottaviani and Peter Norman Sorensen


    Comparison of equilibrium outcomes in parimutuel and fixed-odds competitive markets with privately informed bettors.



  • Parimutuel versus Fixed-Odds Markets (165 Kb)
  • Last change 21/06/2013

    Forecasting and Rank-Order Contests
    Marco Ottaviani and Peter Norman Sorensen


    Characterization of equilibrium in Hotelling location model with private information, with applications to strategic forecasting and political economy.



  • Forecasting and Rank-Order Contests (352 Kb)
  • Last change 21/06/2013

    Contracts and Competition in the Pay-TV Market
    David Harbord and Marco Ottaviani


    How is downstream competition affected by the contractual terms used to sell essential inputs to competitors?



  • Contracts and Competition in the Pay-TV Market (346 Kb)
  • Last change 21/12/2012

    The Economics of Advice
    Marco Ottaviani


    Analysis of issues relevant for regulation of independent financial advisers: communication to unsophisticated audience, information acquisition by advisers, uncertainty about the conflict of interest, and optimal incentive design.



  • The Economics of Advice (334 Kb)
  • Last change 21/12/2012



    Last updated November 18, 2011