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Publications

Public Policies in Investment Intensive Industries, Chap. 13 (in 'The Analysis of Competition Policy and Sectoral Regulation') (03/10/2014)

POLO MICHELE (with Giovanni Immordino)
Peitz & Spiegel editors, World Scientific-Now Publishers Series in Business: Vol. 4, 2014

  • Public Policies in Investment Intensive Industries (181 Kb - english version)
  • Last change 03/10/2014

    Antitrust, legal standards and investment (28/08/2014)

    POLO MICHELE (Joint with Giovanni Immordino)
    International Review of Law and Economics - ELSEVIER

  • Antitrust, legal standards and investment (503 Kb - english version)
  • Last change 03/10/2014

    Liberalizing the gas industry: Take-or-pay contracts, retail competition and wholesale trade (13/12/2012)

    POLO MICHELE
    International Journal of Industrial Organization

  • Liberalizing the gas industry: Take-or-pay contracts, retail competition and wholesale trade (544 Kb)
  • Last change 09/01/2013

    L'intervento antitrust in materia di pratiche escludenti: lezioni dal dibattito recente (2010)

    POLO MICHELE
    in 20 anni di Antitrust (a cura di C.Rabitti Bedogni e P.Barucci), Torino, Giappichelli

  • Lintervento antitrust in materia di pratiche escludenti: lezioni dal dibattito recente (90 Kb - italian version)
  • Last change 10/01/2011

    Damages for Exclusionary Practices: a Primer (2010)

    POLO MICHELE (joint with C.Fumagalli e J.Padilla)
    in I.Kokkonis e F.Etro (eds.) Competition Law and the Enforcement of Article 82, Oxford UP

  • Damages for Exclusionary Practices: a Primer (166 Kb)
  • Last change 10/01/2011

    Incentives to Innovate and Social Harm: Laissez-faire, Authorization or Penalties (02/02/2011)

    POLO MICHELE (joint with Marco Pagano and Giovanni Immordino)
    Journal of Public Economics 95 (2011) 864-876

    When firms' research can lead to potentially harmful innovations, public intervention may thwart their incentives to undertake research by reducing its expected profitability (average deterrence) and may guide the use of innovation (marginal deterrence). We compare four policy regimes: laissez faire, ex-post penalties and two forms of authorization -- lenient and strict. If fines are unbounded, laissez faire is optimal if the social harm from innovation is sufficiently unlikely; otherwise, regulation should impose increasing penalties as innovation becomes more dangerous. If fines are bounded by limited liability, for intermediate levels of expected social harm it is optimal to adopt (indifferently) penalties or lenient authorization, while strict authorization becomes optimal if social harm is sufficiently likely.



  • Incentives to innovate and social harm: Laissez-faire, authorization or penalties? (446 Kb - english version)
  • Last change 03/10/2014

    Competitive v. Anticompetitive Explanations of Unilateral Practices: the Identification Problem (20/11/2009)

    POLO MICHELE
    Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2010, 1:1.20.

  • Competitive v. Anticompetitive Explanations of Unilateral Practices: the Identification Problem (228 Kb)
  • Last change 04/03/2010

    Regulation for Pluralism in the Media Markets (2007)

    POLO MICHELE
    in: P.Seabright J. von Hagen (eds.), The Economic Regulation of Broadcasting Markets, Cambridge U.P.

  • Regulation for Pluralism in Media Markets (200 Kb)
  • Last change 04/03/2010

    Buyer Power and Quality Improvements (2007)

    POLO MICHELE (with P.Battigalli and C.Fumagalli)
    Research in Economics, 61: 45-61

  • Buyer Power and Quality Improvements (381 Kb)
  • Last change 04/03/2010

    Price Squeeze: Lessons from the Telecom Italia Case (2007)

    POLO MICHELE
    Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 3: 453 - 470

  • Price Squeeze: Lessons from the Telecom Italia Case (207 Kb)
  • Last change 04/03/2010

    Entry, Product Line Expansion and Predation (2007)

    POLO MICHELE (with V.Denicol and P.Zanchettin)
    Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 3: 609 - 624

  • Entry, Product Line Expansion and Predation (116 Kb)
  • Last change 04/03/2010

    Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution (13/02/2001)

    POLO MICHELE (with M.Motta)
    International Journal of Industrial Organization.

  • download (436 Kb)
  • Last change 05/12/2008

    Are Judges Biased by Labor Market Conditions? (25/06/2002)

    POLO MICHELE (with A.Ichino e E.Rettore)
    European Economic Review

  • download (377 Kb)
  • Last change 05/12/2008

    Beyond the Spectrum Constraint: Concentration and Entry in the Broadcasting Industry (2001)

    POLO MICHELE (with M.Motta)
    Rivista di Politica Economica

     

     



    Last change 05/12/2008

    Merger Remedies in the EU: an Overview (17/02/2002)

    POLO MICHELE (with M.Motta e H.Vasconcelos)
    The Antitrust Bulletin

  • download (116 Kb)
  • Last change 05/12/2008



    Last updated September 15, 2008