FRANCESCO DECAROLIS

Born May 17, 1980. Degree in Economics cum laude from Università Bocconi in 2002. PhD in Economics from University of Chicago in 2009.

Associate Professor, Università Bocconi since 1st November 2017. Full Professor qualification obtained in 2016 (13-A1, A2 and A3 bando D.D. 1532/2016). Associate Professor (with Tenure) at EIEF-Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (2016). Assistant Professor at Boston University (2012-2016). Since 2017 European Commission - DG Comp, Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy (EAGCP). Since 2016 NBER, Faculty Research Fellow and since 2015 CEPR, Research Affiliate, UK. He has awarded the following grants:

2021-2025 European Research Council - Consolidator Grant: Competition in digital markets

2019-2022 PRIN (2017TMFPSH): The impact of algorithms on prices in online marketplaces

2016-2020 European Research Council - Starting Grant: Reputation and corruption in procurement

2013-2015 National Science Foundation (# SES-1357705): Supply side behavior in Medicare Part D

2011-2012 Sloan Foundation (# 2011-5-23 ECON): The role of public subsidies in Medicare Part D

Industrial Organization, Applied Microeconomics, Market Design, Health Economics.

“Awarding Price, Contract Performance and Bids Screening: Evidence from Procurement Auctions” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, Vol. 6, Iss. 1, January 2014, pp. 108-132. “Medicare Part D: Are Insurers Gaming the Low Income Subsidy Design?” American Economic Review, April 2015, 105(4): 1547-80. “Entry and Subcontracting in Public Procurement Auctions,” with N. Branzoli Management Science, Vol. 61, Iss. 12, December 2015, pp. 2945–2962. “Local Public Procurement Regulations: The Case of Italy” with C. Giorgiantonio International Review of Law and Economics, Vol. 43, August 2015, pp 209–226. “Renegotiation of Public Contracts: An Empirical Analysis” (with G. Palumbo) Economic Letters, Vol. 132, July 2015, pp. 77-81. “Detecting Bidders Groups in Collusive Auctions” (with T. Conley) American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 8, No. 2 May 2016, pp. 1-38. “Insurers Response to Selection Risk: Evidence from Medicare Enrollment Reforms” with A. Guglielmo, Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 56, 2017, pp 383–396. “Comparing Procurement Auctions,” International Economic Review, forthcoming.